Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Great hearing, and very much appreciated. And outstanding witnesses.

Thank you very much.

And to Mr. Pickering, Ambassador Pickering, the isotope offer, if

you will, that you are talking about, that is an old offer. Is there

any reason to believe that today that still has a degree of life?

Thank you.

General Cartwright, I certainly want to thank you for all the

time you spent with me during the Libyan issue, and I really

appreciate it. I know you had a lot going on, and thank you for

your service.

And speaking of that, what would the leadership of Iran take

away from Libya? I know that has been alluded to, but we had diplomatic

relations. They did do away with their weapons of mass

destruction, and we did, in fact, implement regime changes. So

what did they learn from this?

And just for what it is worth, you know, to me,

that was a problem with our involvement there and expressed it

at the time, and mostly what the outcome ends up being. You

talked about the difference between shield and sword, and obviously,

the shield component, especially in light of what you just

said, is, you would think, of paramount importance, especially

when you only have a handful of weapons at most.

What is it in their psychology that would move them along

toward the franchise component where they would actually allow

those weapons to be in terrorist hands? And this is way down the

road, I understand. But why would that be in their self-interest in

any way?

You mentioned the opportunity Iran may see

this year because of all the leadership changes that are taking

place around the world. I didn’t exactly understand what that

opportunity might be for them.

During that period of time?

But I still don’t understand—I understand they

don’t know what the outcomes of these elections might be, and you

don’t know whether they would be good or bad for them. None of

us know that here.

I don’t understand what actions, though, that would cause them

internally to possibly take.

Is there, speaking of declaring and not declaring,

do you sense—and our intelligence community, obviously, has

come under much criticism because of the Iraq issue. Do you

sense—and you know, I had a classified briefing yesterday at

length. I didn’t really learn anything that I haven’t read multiple

times in the Washington Post and the New York Times.

And is there a sense from your perspective that because of what

happened with Iraq that the intelligence community is almost overconcerned

about saying anything that might be provocative, and I

mean, is there a hesitancy on their part to really lay out more provocative

situations as it relates to Iran?

Just one last question, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Sadjadpour, what is our policy as it relates to Iran? Is it regime

change, or is it not? I mean, I think that would be an interesting

thing for me to even know.